Die Discussion Papers dienen einer möglichst schnellen Verbreitung von neueren Forschungsarbeiten des ZEW. Die Beiträge liegen in alleiniger Verantwortung der Autoren und stellen nicht notwendigerweise die Meinung des ZEW dar.
Introduction
Many policy makers and entrepreneurship scholars regard high-tech start-ups as driving forces for economic growth, job creation and structural change. The successful realization of the founders' idea is a necessary condition for the expected positive impact of start-ups. The probability of firm's success depends on the existence of growth supporting factors and the elimination of growth obstacles.
Financing is one of the most critical obstacles of new firm growth (Moore 1994, Berger and Udell 1998) . Binks and Ennew (1996) show that younger and growing firms suffer more from credit constraints than older and non-growing firms. New firm's equity position is very weak and debt financing is often impossible or restricted (Sitglitz and Weiß 1981) . The higher risk of failure of young innovative firms and missing tangible assets as collateral leads to credit rationing by lenders with the result of a funding gap.
Private equity investors are supposed to make an important contribution by closing the funding gap for young, innovative firms. Investments in young firms with a high growth potential are a special part of private equity activities and are well-known as venture capital finance. Venture capital also plays a crucial role in the financing and commercial exploitation of new technologies. Kortum and Lerner (1998) found venture capital funding has a positive impact on the number of patented innovations using industry-as well as firm-level data. However, not only high-tech firms received venture capital. Firms in low-tech industries are also financed with venture capital (Gompers 1999) . The crucial criterion for venture capitalists to invest in young firms is the expectation of growth of those investments. This growth is regularly based on a unique selling proposition.
The adoption of venture capital as an additional financing resource is immediately associated with the existence of profitable exit option for venture capitalists. The most attractive possibility of divestment typically is public offerings (Amit et al. 1998 ). This fact and a lot of US-success stories imply a greater attention by government in nearly all European countries to push the growth of venture capital industry in the last decade. Beside a lot of law regulations, the most prominent activity is the introduction of special segments for growth companies at various Venture capitalists monitor business activities of their portfolio firms and often provide additional services beside the financial involvement to close the gap in managing non-technical shortcomings (Amit et al. 1998 , Berger and Udell 1998 , Gompers and Lerner 1999 . The role of venture capitalists offers some advantageous conditions for the growth of venture-backed firms. A lot of recent studies examined empirically the relationship between receiving venture capital and firm performance (see Schefczyk 2000 for an detailed overview). Sapienza (1992) found that the provided services are positively related to the performance of venture-backed firms. Jain and Kini (1995) show that venture-backed firms publicly offered at stockmarkets have a higher cash flow and sales growth. Lerner (1999) evaluates the longrun success of firms participating in the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program, a major public assistance initiative in the United States for hightechnology firms. Those receiving assistance from SBIR achieve significantly higher employment and sales growth rates than similar No-SBIR assisted firms between 1983 and 1995. These differences are even more pronounced in ZIP codes with high venture capital activity. Manigart and Hyfte's (1999) findings for 187 Belgian venture-backed firms are quite different. Belgian venture-backed firms do not achieve a significant higher employment growth compared to non-venture backed firms of the same industries, of similar size, and similar age. However, higher growth rates in total assets and cash flow are obvious. Buergel et al. (2000) do not observe any significant effect of venture capital finance on firms' sales and employment growth. Their multivariate analysis of the determinants of firm growth is based on a questionnaire of 500 German and British high-tech start-ups.
Most of recent studies compare venture-backed firms with those that received no venture capital at all based on the consideration of few important firm characteristics that may influence the probability of receiving venture capital and the propensity to grow. It follows from this that the estimated impact of venture capital is potentially biased. Hence, the study uses an econometric selection approach to estimate the mean impact resulting from receiving venture capital. The approach allows to control two possible sources of selections. The first one results from the decision of venture capitalist to finance only firms with a high potential of growth. The second one controls for the availability of suitable information to carry out the analysis about the mean impact of venture capital. Furthermore, this paper picks up the discussion about two other relationships. Some authors argue that venture capitalists are more able to push the firms than other investors (Amit et al. 1998) . Others emphasize that venture capitalists' contribution is dependent on new firms' innovation level (Timmons and Bygrave 1986, Sapienza 1992 ).
This study is structured as follows: I derive some hypotheses about the impact of the involvement of venture capitalist on new firms growth in chapter 2. Chapter 3 deals with the econometric specification of the model in order to test for hypotheses. the empirical analysis of impact of venture capital finance on new firms' growth is based on data from the ZEW-Foundation Panels. Comments about the identification of venture-backed firms in the database are given in chapter 4. Estimations results and their discussion are presented in chapter 5. The main results are finally summarized in chapter 6.
Hypotheses
Berger and Udell (1998) and Gompers and Lerner (1999) emphasize three reasons why venture-backed firms outperform non-venture-backed firms: pre-investment screening, monitoring and value adding. Entrepreneurs seek financial resources and offers projects to venture capitalist. Venture capitalists make expectations about the net cash flow R of their investment which is determined by project quality q, entrepreneur's effort e and provided services s. According Amit et al. (1998) In the first stage (pre-investment screening), projects whose expected return E(V) is above a minimum value are selected. Venture capitalists' assessments of entrepreneur's effort and project quality as critical variables are based on criteria for successful ventures (Tyebjee and Bruno 1984) . Firms with such criteria have a higher probability of receiving venture capital. For firms not meeting those criteria, a lower potential of high growth is assumed. Only 5 per cent of all offered projects are financed with venture capital (Gebhardt and Schmidt 2001) .
The decline of the financial constraints with the investment by the venture capitalist, the monitoring activities and the provided services in the second stage (investment stage) indicate a positive impact on firm performance in venture-backed firms.
Monitoring the entrepreneur combined and control rights help to reduce moral hazard problems and stimulate entrepreneur's effort on the one hand. 3 Provided services (e.g. advice, adding reputation, etc.) increase entrepreneur's skill to manage obstacles on the other hand. All this positively determines the net cash flow and therefore the return V. Following from this: · Hypothesis 1: Venture-backed firms perform better than non-venture-backed firms as a consequence of the involvement of venture capitalist.
A higher risk of insufficient market acceptance of new products at the market entry leads to more attention, monitoring the business activities of innovative firms and provided services by venture capitalists or other investors. Given a positive relationship between provided services and the performance of the portfolio company, the impact on firm performance is supposed to be larger in firms with a high innovation level. Sapienza (1992) found that the venture capitalist' role in portfolio companies increases with the innovation level of the firm related to competitors. The amount of provided services and monitoring may also associate with the differentiation between high-tech and low-tech industries. 4 Typically innovative high risk projects have a greater variance as non-innovative low-risk projects (Sitglitz and Weiß 1981). Almus et al. (1999) show that growth rates of firms in high-tech manufacturing have a greater variance than other manufacturing firms. Therefore, the hypothesis seems to be testable on the level of industries and is: · Hypothesis 2: The impact of venture capital is greater for firms in high-tech industries compared to firms in low-tech industries.
3 Jensen and Meckling (1976) show that the increase of a leads to more non-pecuniary benefits consumed by entrepreneur which negatively affect the firm's value. However, it can easily be assumed that monitoring and control mechanism reduce the consumption of those benefits. 4 The hypothesis is tested on the aggregated level of industries because information about the firm's innovation activities are not available in the database. 
Evaluating the impact of venture capital for firms in high-tech and low-tech industries and the comparison with the impact of other investors leads to the following specification of the growth equation:
Vector G in equation (2) Equation (2) can be estimated by using a linear regression model (Evans 1987) when the vector of the error term u has the expected value zero and the variance s u 2 .
Results for determinants of interest can be biased if a potential selection exists. Two possible selection problems are identified: selection biases deriving from the observations 2 N without growth rates and selection biases deriving from the preinvestment screening procedure of investors. The first one is controlled by using the sample selection approach developed by Gronau (1974) and Heckman (1974) .
Missing values in the calculated growth rate can be attributed to the inquiry procedure used by Creditreform. Firms with a large amount of business activities, fast growing and rapidly declining firms are surveyed more often than other firms. 
The selection biases deriving from the pre-investment screening procedure of investors are considered with the use of the predicted probability of an early stage investments by a venture capitalist or other external investors. Evaluating the impact during the time of venturing is only possible if effects resulting from the preinvestment screening procedure are excluded. Investment activities of venture capitalists and other investors are based on predictions of the growth potential of firms and therefore "endogenous". Growth potential of firms is determined by firmspecific, management-specific characteristics and firm's environment. Those are considered in vector W VC and W EF , respectively. Therefore, two involvement equations are specified to consider the second selection problem:
One selection and two involvement equations make a trivariate probit model necessary. However, the complex structure hinders the use of a maximum-likelihood estimator. Therefore, a simplification is done so that two bivariate probit models are estimated separately. The first bivariate probit model contains the equations (3) and (4a), the second one include the equations (3) and (4b). Correlation between the error terms of involvement equations (4a and 4b) are ignored with the simplification.
Summarizing, the first model contains equations (2), (3) and (4a) to evaluate the impact of venture capital for new firm growth. The second model includes equations (2), (3) and (4b) 
An extension of Heckman's selection approach from an univariate selection to a bivariate selection is necessary for the estimation of eu s and ev s in both models. The models can be estimated by using a two step procedure (Reize 2001) . Firstly, a bivariate probit model is estimated to calculate the nonselection hazards, referred by Heckman (1979) as the inverses of Mill's ratio u l and v l (see Table 6 ). Here, the involvement and the selection equations are estimated simultaneously. In the second step, the two inverses of Mill's ratio are included in the growth equation as additional exogenous variables and new equation is estimated by using a linear regression model. This procedure is done for the first and second model separately.
Moreover, I take into account the endogeneity of the involvement variables VC and EF in the selection equation (3) 
'
After that I estimate both bivariate probit models again and calculate the Mill's ratios for growth equations. is guaranteed if vector W includes at least one variable which is included neither in vector X or V and if the joint distributional assumption of the error terms is correct (Heckman et al. 1999 ).
The two step procedure produces consistent estimates, however the standard errors are inconsistent. Therefore bootstrapping of standard errors is used to get consistent standard errors (Reize 2001) .
Definition of venture-backed firms
This firm specific data in the ZEW Foundations Panels has been provided by the largest German credit rating agency "Creditreform" since 1991. Almost all firms registered in the trade register enter Creditreform's database. In contrast, the entry Table 2 ). Firms founded with other legal forms have a very low 8 The government becomes committed as a silent partner in new firms assisted the BTU program, Germany' largest federal program to promote venture capital activities in early stage, subjected to a venture capitalist involvement as lead investor. 9 Only 60 percent of all start-ups being founded since 1999 are recorded for the first time by
Creditreform by January 2001. Therefore, the analysis focuses on new firms with a foundation date between 1991 and 1998 to avoid selection problems inside the cohorts. < Table 2 about here >
Results
All investments which are started in maximum three years old firms are defined as early stage investments. Hence, 777 of 1,074 firms count as venture-backed firms.
Only 632 Table 3 shows large growth differences between venture-backed and non-venturebacked firms. Venture-backed firms in high-tech industries achieve 42 per cent annual employment growth rates. Unlike them, non-venture backed firms realize only 14 per cent. An unreported common t-test emphasizes significant differences between the means. Smaller differences are obvious for both groups in low-tech industries. The most impressive result is that the median of employment growth rates for venture backed firms differs from zero. However, growth rates vary dramatically for the group of venture-backed firms. The high standard deviation of growth rates results from the high risk of failure as well as a lot of chances for success.
< Table 3 
Evaluating the impact during the time of venturing is only possible if effects
resulting from the pre-investment screening procedure are excluded. The discussed econometric selection approach is one way to realize that. Following from this, average growth rates reported in Table 3 Table 5 ). That means, unobservable factors reduce the probability of calculating a growth rate if a high probability of the involvement of venture capitalist or external firms is obvious. Summarizing, the consideration of both selection rules, the selection biases derived from observations without growth rate and the selection biases derived from the screening procedure prepared by venture Finally, some initial founding characteristics as critical factors of growth are included in the estimations and are discussed briefly. Those are frequently in accordance with the predictions. Smaller firms realize higher growth rates (Sutton 1997) . Hence, Gibrat's Law of proportional growth is rejected for small firms.
Firm's age is negatively correlated with growth rates. The thesis that new firms have to grow up very fast in early years (Jovanovic 1982 ) is confirmed by this variable.
Dependent foundations and public limited companies achieve higher growth rates.
Lower financial constraints offer advantageous conditions for growth in these firms.
Diversified firms and team foundations achieve higher growth rates. Moreover, the environment of foundation location has some impact on firms' growth and is in accordance with the predictions. The number of employees in the same branch measures the effects of localization of the same industries (according to the two or three digit codes) and is positively related to firms' growth. On the contrary to expectations, regions with a large number of R&D employees in manufacturing seem to offer some disadvantageous conditions for new firm development. Growth rates of new firms are significantly smaller in those regions. Possibly, variable also measures the negative impact of agglomerations, because largest R&D centres are located in the biggest German cities. A positive impact of technological knowledge concentrated at universities on firm growth is evident only for firms in low-tech industries. Those firms in regions with a large number of scientific staff at public R&D institutes achieve smaller growth rates.
The estimation results from the involvement equations show some interesting facts (see Table 5 ). The results are in accordance with the predictions about the key role of some firm-specific, founder-specific characteristics as well as the firm's environment. Start-ups founded between 1995 and 1998 have a significantly higher probability of receiving venture capital finance than start-ups founded in earlier years. This finding was expected owing to a considerable increase of early stage funding by venture capitalists since the establishment of the "Neuer Markt" in 1997.
Firms in industries with a high innovation level receive more often venture capital in comparison with the reference group of firms with business activities in real estates.
Team foundations and male-dominated firms are also preferred by venture capitalists. A team of founders with management activities is more able to overcome business difficulties because potential individual know-how deficits may be compensated (Storey 1994) . Information about firms with a significant amount of business activities are up-to-date, because they are more often surveyed by
Creditreform. The probability of receiving venture capital is higher for those firms compared to the other ones. New firms with business activities in growing industries, measured by the change of the number of foundations between the foundation year and 1999, are also preferred by venture capitalists. Investors frequently tend to look for firms in R&D intensive regions and urban centres because the probability of finding an interesting project is higher in those regions.
New venture-backed firms are more often established near institutions of HelmholtzSociety and in urban centres. The average size of the Helmholtz-Societies is dramatically larger compared to other public-R&D institutions. This fact allows one to that a higher probability for commercial exploitation of new technologies is connected with a higher probability for venture capital funding. Hence, a stronger importance compared to other R&D-institutions is not surprising. The most important fact is that the involvement of a venture capitalist is a positive signal for other investors, customers and suppliers. Frequently, links with other firms increase the probability of receiving venture capital.
Summary
The paper empirically tests some hypotheses about the role of the venture capitalist as a signal for a firm which is performing well in contacts with suppliers, customers and partners. Moreover, the involvement of venture capitalists is affected by the involvement of other external firms as investors. In this paper the impact of venture capital funding on short-term growth of surviving firms is examined. An interesting question for further studies is whether venture-backed firms achieve a sustainable medium and long-term growth and whether results are the same if non-surviving firms are included. Timmons, J.A. and W.D. Bygrave (1986) , Venture capital's role in financing innovation for economic growth, Journal of Business Venturing 1, 161-76. Tyebjee, T.T. and A.V. Bruno (1984) , 233, 2411-2414, 2417, 242, 243, 244, 2461-2464, 2466, 291, 293, 294, 2952-2956, 296, 300, 322, 323, 311, 314, 315, 3162, 321, 331, 332, 333, 334, 341, 343, 352 Grupp and Legler (2000) , own differentiation. (131) 1,585.21** 1,708.08** ** significant on the 1%-level, * significant on the 5%-level. The selection equation contains dummies for both industries and German federal states. The indicator variables for the Creditreform Societies measure variation concerning inquiries about firms and are considered in the selection equation.
